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Dana Giovannetti* The Principle of Analogy in
Sino-Soviet Criminal Laws
I. Introduction
"Analogy" is a principle of substantive criminal law which permits
the conviction of an accused despite the absence of any defined
criminal behavior.' If the actions of the accused are perceived to be
inimical to the socio-political order then he may be found guilty of a
defined crime which prohibits analogous behavior. Analogy may
also be employed in a more restrained fashion as a principle of
sentencing law. If the accused has committed a defined crime which
is now perceived to be more deleterious his punishment may exceed
the maximum legislatively mandated sentence. Analogy is,
therefore, one method of defining and punishing acts which are
perceived to be iniquitous. In this application, analogy is
qualitatively distinguished from liberal statutory interpretation, 2 and
it frequently includes or accompanies the retroactive application of
law.
The principle of analogy is neither the product of twentieth
century jurisprudence, 3 nor is its application confined to regimes
which Westerners characterize as totalitarian. 4 However, it was
employed until 1958 in the Soviet Union and it is still in use in the
People's Republic of China. Our focus will be primarily on these
modern applications.
The use of analogy is anathema to the Western tradition. The
contrasting philosophy in Europe is expressed in the maxim Nulla
crimen sine lege, Nulla poena sine lege, 5 the essence of which is
*B.A. LL.B. LL.M., of the Nova Scotia Bar
1. See generally, Note "The Use of Analogy in Criminal Law" (1947), 47 Col. L.
Rev. 613-629; "The Principle of Analogy in Criminal Law: An Aspect of Soviet
Legal Thinking", Research Project on the USSR, Mimeographed Series No. 55,
New York City (1954).
2. J. Hall, "Nulla Poena Sine Lege" (1937), 47 Yale L.J. 165-174; J. Hall,
"General Principles of Criminal Law", beginning at 35 (1960).
3. SeeAnalogy in History, infra.
4. Note, supra note 1 at 628.
5. Hall, supra note 2 (1937) at 165 has written: "Nullapoena sine lege has several
meanings. In a narrower connotation of that specific formula it concerns the
treatment-consequence element of penal laws: no person shall be punished except
in pursuance of a statute which fixes a penalty for criminal penalty. Employed as
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that no person may be punished except under the authority of a
statute which defines the act as criminal and prescribes the
permissible punishment. This maxim is usually found to exist
concomitantly with the requirement that penal statutes must be
strictly construed and not applied retroactively. A similar tradition
exists in Anglo-American law, where the principle nulla poena sine
lege is included within the group of principles known as the rule of
law. The dichotomy between analogy and nulla poena sine lege is
our second and subsidiary enquiry.
The doctrinal justifications and actual applications of analogy
have been protean. Analogy permits and encourages flexibility.
6 It
imbues the administration of criminal law with a chameleon
character. Westerners view this chameleon character as corrosive to
our concept of justice. The study of analogy may therefore provide
one method of contrasting fundamental beliefs.
II. Analogy in History
1. Tsarist Russia
It is not surprising that Lenin, who characterized law as politics,
7
sought an early renunication of pre-revolutionary laws and on
November 30, 1918, the application of these earlier laws was
explicitly prohibited. 8 However, analysis of the early developments
in Soviet legality indicates that not all traces of the past were
eradicated. In particular, the development and application of
analogy in the new regime is not without an historical foundation. 9
nullum poena sine lege, the prohibition is that no conduct shall be held criminal
unless it is specifically described in the behaviour circumstances element of a penal
statute. In addition, nulla poena sine lege has been understood to include the rule
that penal statutes must be strictly construed. A final, important signification of the
rule is that penal laws shall not be given retroactive effect." Also see, J. Hall,
supra note 2 (1960); Claser, "Nullum Poena Sine Lege" (1942), 24 Journal of
Comparative Legislation and International Law 29; R. Miller, "Comparison of the
basic philosophies underlying Anglo-American Criminal Law and Russian
Criminal Law" (1954), 23 University of Kansas City L. Rev. 62 at 72-80 (1954),
G. Williams, "Criminal Law, the General Part" 2d (London: Stevens, (1961),
chapter 12.
6. J. Hazard, Communists and Their Law (1969), 69-101 ("Flexibility versus
Stability").
7. "A law is a political instrument; it is politics;" discussed by Hazard, Id. at 69.
8. (1917-1918), Sob. Uzak. RSFSR, No. 52, item 889. An annotation specifically
stated, "reference in judgements and decisions to the statutes of the overthrown
governments is prohibited." See Starosolskyj, supra note 1 at 9.
9. N.S. Timasheff, "The Impact of the Penal Law of Imperial Russia on Soviet
Penal Law" (1950), 12 American Slavic & East European Review 441.
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The Penal Code of 1845 contained in article 151 the statement
that "if the law does not contain a definite provision about the crime
which is being tried, the court sentences the offender to the
punishment applicable to a crime most similar to the one
committed, as to kind and gravity."' 0 In practice, the reach of this
provision was limited, at least during the last two decades of the
nineteenth century," to sentencing law when a defined crime was
silent on the applicable punishment. Article 151 was eliminated by
article 1 of the 1903 Penal Code in its provision that "an action is
considered criminal if, at the time of its performance, it was
prohibited by law under the threat of punishment.' 12 Thus, not only
analogy, but also retroactive application of law was abolished. This
continued to be the law until 1917.
2. Imperial China to 1949
In China, the criminal laws of the last Imperial dynasty (Ch'ing
1644-1912) provided for their analogous application. 13 For
example, s. CCCLXXXVI provided that "whoever is guilty of
improper conduct, and such as is contrary to the spirit of the laws,
shall be punished, at the least, with 40 blows and when the
impropriety is on a serious nature, with 80 blows."' 4 Further in
Professor Cohen's opinion, new criminal laws were applied
retroactively, and "when in 1912 the Ch'ing was succeeded by the
Republic of China, there was no developed concepts of 'rights' of
the accused as limitations upon the state."' 5 It is difficult to
reconcile this with the opinion of Fu-Mei Chang Chen who has
concluded that the principle nulla poena sine lege was a part of
traditional Chinese law.' 6 She has written that "the Ch'ing judges
10. Id. at 449.
11. Id. at 449.
12. Id. at 448.
13. See generally, Chen, "On Analogy in Ch'ing Law" (1970), 30 Harvard
Journal of Asiatic Studies 212.
14. Translated in Cohen, "The Criminal Process in the People's Republic of China
1949-1963", (1968) 339. Also note Section XLIV: "From the impracticability of
providing for every possible contingency, there may be cases to which no laws or
statutes are precisely applicable; such cases may then be determined, by an accurate
comparison with others which are already provided for, and which approach most
nearly to those under investigation, in order to ascertain afterwards to what extent
an aggravation or mitigation of the punishment would be equitable ..
translated in Cohen, 338-339.
15. Id. at 7.
16. Chen, supra note 13, at 214.
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rarely employed the principle of analogy to create new crimes
and . . the code prohibits ex post facto penalization." 17 This
assessment is supported by Meijer who, commenting on the state of
Chinese law at the turn of the century, wrote that "the legal
provisions were models, and analogical application was
allowed . . . analogy, however, was only to a small extent subject
to the discretion of the judge, rules existed in this respect, which are
found in appendices in some editions of the code."18
During the early 1900s serious attempts were made to modernize
Chinese criminal law. A draft code in 1907 contained provisions
abolishing analogy' 9 and in article 10 specifically set out the
principle nulla poena sine lege.20 However, this draft, and
subsequent revisions, was never promulgated by the Emperor. The
new code was promulgated soon after Sun Yet-Sen's party came to
power.2
1
Analogy was used by the communists during the transitional
period 1924 to 1949. Article 38 of the Statute of the Chinese Soviet
Republic Governing Punishment of Counterrevolutionaries, prom-
ulgated in 1934, provided that "any counterrevolutionary criminal
behavior not included in this statute shall be punished according to
the article in the Statute dealing with similar crimes. ' 22 The
Communists therefore rejected the concept nulla poena sine lege. 23
Analogy was not the only instrument of expediency. There were
few legal codes, and the statutes that existed were ambiguous.
Meijer has written that "the most encompassing word describing
the legal policies of the Chinese Communists during the 1924-1949
period is flexibility." 
24
17. Id. at 216.
18. M. Meijer, The Introduction of Modern Criminal Law in China (Bafavia:
Koninklijke Drukkerij de Unie, 1967), p. 4.
19. Id. at 68.
20. Id. at 71.
21. Id. at 119.
22. Translated in P. Griffin, The Chinese Communist Treatment of Counter-
revolutionaries, 1924-1949, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 167.
23. Id. at 51; see also, Lin, "Communist China's Emerging Fundamentals of
Criminal Law" (1964), 13 Amer. J. of Comp. Law 80 at 23.
24. Meijer, supra note 18 at 143.
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III. Analogy and War Communism
1. Soviet Union (1917-1922)
The period from the 1917 Revolution to the establishment of
Federation on December 29, 1922 saw a dramatic shift in
fundamental notions of Soviet legality and, in particular, in the
sources of law. 25 There is no evidence that the Provisional
Government intended to abandon the 1903 Penal Code and its
principle nulla poena sine lege.2 6 But following the establishment
of Bolshevik power the former sources of law were quickly
abandoned. Also the definition of crime as a violation of an
established norm was quickly replaced by a "material" concept
27
according to which crime consisted in any socially dangerous
activity. This developed logically from the Marxist belief that "law
rests upon society, it must be the expression of the general interests
that spring from the material production of a given society.' '28
Similarly, the bourgeois "justice" had been rejected by Engels as
"nothing more than an expression of the existing economic
relations dressed up with idealistic, bombastic gilding.' '29
The function of Soviet law before it "withers away" was not to
be the enforcement of defined norms, but the protection of the new
proletarian rule from socially dangerous activity.2 0 The principal
source of law became the elusive notion of the socialist
consciousness of law, 31 supplemented by a few Decrees. Judges
were instructed to breathe life into revolutionary legality by the
individual application of their socialist consciousness. This
appeared theoretically to involve the intuitive 32 identification of
new concepts of right and wrong emerging from the destruction of
bourgeois society and law and the creation of a society to be erected
on the bedrock of Marxist beliefs. In its application such legal
nihilism was an invitation to rampant judicial legislation on an ad
25. See generally, Starosolskyj, supra note 1; V. Gsouski, "The Soviet Concept of
Law" (1938), 7 Fordham L. Rev. 1.
26. "In general the legal viewpoint of the Provisional Government was that of
preserving the 'continuity of legal order"', Starosolskyj, supra note 1 at 6.
27. See generally Starosolskyj, supra note 1.
28. Translated and discussed in Gsouski, supra note 25 at 5.
29. Translated and discussed in Starosolskyj, supra note 1 at 21. In response, one
may question whether there is Soviet "Justice": see H. Berman, "The Law of the
Soviet State" (1955), 6 Soviet Studies.
30. Starosolskyj, supra note I at 24.
31. Id. at 18.
32. Id. at 28.
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hoc, case by case basis; or, at least, judicial creativity subject only
to the judges' perceptions of Party policy.
The R.S.F.S.R. had enacted General Principles of Criminal
Law33 in December, 1919, but this legislation did not enumerate
any defined crimes. The first code 34 enacted in the continental style
of a general and special part became effective on June 1, 1922. The
principle of analogy was contained in article 10 which provided that
"in case of absence of a direct provision for a particular kind of
crime in the Criminal Code, the punishment or means of social
defence shall be applied, with observance of the rules of the General
Part, according to those articles of the Criminal Code which provide
for crimes most similar as to importance and kind." 35
Following ratification of the first Federal Constitution on January
13, 1924, Basic Principles of the Criminal Law of the USSR were
enacted and these contained an analogy provision. 36 The 1922
R.S.F.S.R. code was replaced in 1926, 37 and analogy was restated
in article 16: "if a socially dangerous act is not directly foreseen by
the present Code, the grounds and limits of responsibility for its
commission shall be based on those articles of the present Code,
providing for crimes most similar in kind." Thus, analogy became a
characteristic of Soviet criminal law and it remained so until 1958.
2. People's Republic of China (1949-1953)
In China, the period 1949 to 1953 is "roughly comparable" 38 to the
period of war communism in the Soviet Union. The laws of the
Nationalist regime were abrogated by the Chinese Communists in
1948, 39 and this was formalized in 1949, following the establish-
ment of the People's Republic of China, by article 17 of the
Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference. 40 A codification commission was set up to prepare new
33. December 12, 1918 (1919) 1 Sob. Uzak. R.S.F.S.R., No. 66, item 590.
34. (1922) 1 Sob. Uzak. R.S.F.S.R., No. 15, item 153.
35. Translated and discussed by Starosolskyj, supra note 1 at 16.
36. Translated and discussed, id. at 35.
37. Decree of November 22, 1926, (1926) L. Sob. Uzak. R.S.F.S.R., No. 80,
item 600.
38. Cohen, supra note 14 at 9.
39. D. Buxbaum, "Preliminary Trends in the Development of the Legal
Institutions of Communist China and the Nature of the Criminal Law" (1962), 11
Int'l and Comp. Law Quarterly 1 at 5.
40. Tao, "The Criminal Law of Communist China" (1966), 52 Cornell L. Rev.
43 at 49.
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draft codes, but none were forthcoming. Instead, the early years
saw passage of some individual statutes, usually enacted at the end
of great campaigns. For example, The Act for the Punishment of
Counterrevolutionaries, promulgated on February 21, 1951,
provided for analogy in article 16: "Those who, with a
counterrevolutionary purpose, commit crimes not covered by the
provisions of this Act may be given punishments prescribed for
crimes [enumerated] in this Act which are comparable to the crimes
committed."41 Also, the Security Administration Punishment Act,
promulgated on October 22, 1957, provided for analogy to the
"'most similar" enumerated crime.42 The retroactive application of
law was permitted. The new laws were "of the most general and
flexible kind.''43 The evaluation of one writer is that "in Chinese
Communist criminal legislation the definition of specific crimes is
either very broad and imprecise or is not made at all." Principles
such as non-retroactivity of law and nulla poena sine lege were
specifically regarded as anathema to public interest.44
The Chinese justifications for the use of analogy during war
communism and for some time thereafter was the same as the early
Soviet position, which will be examined in detail in the next
section. The argument is stated in the 1957 Peking Lectures in this
manner:
The fact that the criminal law of our country permits analogy is
intimately related to the present political and economic situation
in our country. Our country is now in the period of transition to a
socialist society. Everything is in the midst of ceaseless
development and transformation. The criminal acts committed by
the enemy and other criminals are of all types. They are difficult
to calculate at the time criminal laws are adopted. Therefore, the
present criminal laws of our country cannot include all the types
of criminal acts which may possibly appear or are appearing.
Although such acts occur separately, in order to guarantee (the
continuance of) the struggle against those acts which are in
substance socially dangerous but for which there are no direct
provisions of current criminal legislation, it is necessary that
judges be allowed the use of analogy in the conduct of their
work.
4 5
41. Translated in Cohen, supra note 14 at 302.
42. Id. at 220.
43. Buxbaum, supra note 39 at 4.
44. Leng, "Justice in Communist China" (1967) at 42.
45. Translated in Cohen, supra note 14 at 332.
The Principle of Analogy in Sino-Soviet Criminal Laws 389
IV. Analogy Under the New Regimes
1. Soviet Union (1922-1958)
(a) Before Stalin
In the years from the 1920s until the formal abolition of analogy in
1958 there was a lively debate among Soviet theorists concerning
the proper application of this principle, a debate which reflected
changing concepts concerning the role of criminal law during the
development of socialism and beyond. In the early years, the class
character of Soviet law and the sharp distinction between political
and non-political crimes conditioned the application of analogy. A
1924 theorist stated that the objective of criminal law was "the
defense of the toilers' state from crimes and from socially
dangerous elements." 4 6 In 1927 Krylenko stated that "in all
instances, the interests of the whole, the duty to safeguard the social
order are to be the decisive criteria." 4 7 Obviously, under such
theories the protection of the individual is of little importance.
There were only two criteria established for the application of
analogy: first, "the act to which a particular article of the speical
part is to be applied by way of analogy should conform to the
general definition of crime provided for by . . . the Criminal Code;
and secondly, the application of analogy should be of exceptional
character.' '48 This so-called general definition of crime means "any
act or ommission that is directed against the Soviet system or that
violates the legal order established by the workers peasant power
during the period of transition to the communist system." ' 4 9 A
criteria of this kind can provide little doctrinal restraint. The
evidence is that analogy was applied in both of its capacities, i.e. to
define crimes and to increase penalties, and with particular vigor for
crimes of a political nature. The impetus for the perceived necessity
of analogy was the belief that class enemies were everywhere in the
new Soviet state. 50
46. Piontkouskii, "Criminal Law of the R.S.F.S.R., General Part" (Moscow,
1924) at 215, translated in Berman, "Materials for Comparison of Soviet and
American Law" (Harvard Law School, 1958) at 147.
47. Translated and discussed in Gsouski, supra note 25 at 2-3.
48. Pointkouskii, supra note 46, translated in Berman, supra note 46 at 148.
49. R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code, translated in Berman, id. at 147.
50. P. Solomon, Soviet Criminologists and Criminal Policy (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1978, p. 23.
390 The Dalhousie Law Journal
The Soviet theorists of principal importance before the Stalinist
era, and particularly dominant in the post-NEP period, were
Pashukanis supported by Krylenko. 51 Pashukanis developed the
so-called "commodity-exchange" theory. In general, his belief was
that the capitalist system was based upon barter or exchange, and,
consequently, this was the foundation of capitalist law. The
criminal law nulla poena sine lege manifested a principle of
"equivalence", a means of defining permissible retribution, by
which the potential criminal was advised in advance of the price to
be paid for particular forms of criminal activity. The belief was that
criminal law should not be barter, the exchange of a definite penalty
for a defined crime. Rather, a socially dangerous person must be
detained until he is no longer socially dangerous. In destroying class
enemies the targets should not be limited to criminals in the strict
sense. The targets become anyone, to quote Krylenko, "who has
not committed any crime at all but because of their connections with
criminal surroundings or because of their past activity, they give
reason to expect that they could commit a crime.' '52 Indeed, his
proposal was more extreme than the application of analogy under
the 1926 Code. The proposal urged the elimination of specifically
defined crimes and, concomitantly, the creation of crimes ad hoc
upon the most flexible of principles. Crimes were to be considered
either as especially dangerous, if of a political character, or less
dangerous. Examples of these should be given, but there should not
be specific definitions restraining judicial discretion and flexibility.
Dr. Starosoloskyj has observed that there was a belief in the courts
that the theories of Pashukanis and Krylenko would soon be drafted
to replace the 1926 Code and this had a serious impact. Professor
Hazard has written that:
This encouragement of complete disregard of the precise
provisions of the code led to a broad application of the section
permitting application by analogy to punish an act for which there
was no definite section. The court practice had led to the result
that no citizen could foretell what was a possible criminal act. 53
51. See generally, P. Fuller, "Pashukanis and Vyshinski: A Study in the
Development of Marxian Legal Theory" (1949), 47 Mich. L. Rev. 1157; J.
Hazard, "Reforming Soviet Criminal Law" (1939), 29 Journal of American
Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology 157; Gsouski, supra note 25,
Starosolskyj, supra note 1.
52. Translated in Starosolskyj, supra note 1 at 40.
53. Hazard, supra note S1 at 167.
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(b) After Stalin
During the late 1920s and early 1930s the prediction had been for an
early withering away of, among other things, criminal behavior.
This belief was of fundamental influence in determining the scope
of application of analogy and, of course, the theoretical
rationalizations that were required. But with the perhaps surpris-
ingly early announcement in 1936 that socialism had been achieved
and Stalin's call for "stability of laws" 54 it was clear that an
immediate re-evaluation of the continued efficacy of analogy was
required. Neither the old theories, nor the old theorists, 55 would
survive. The old theories were replaced by a call for a more
restrained use of analogy as part of a more stabilized socialist
legality for non-political crimes. Of course, the hunt for
counterrevolutionaries was not abated by stability in non-political
matters. The result was a less-than-peaceful "coexistence of law
and terror". 5 The new theorist was Vyshinsky.
Vyshinsky clearly favored the continued but restrained use of
analogy. In 1937 he wrote that "analogy does not free one from the
necessity of applying legislation, nor give the court or prosecutor
the right to declare criminal a particular act at its
caprice . . . without referring to the specific law in effect".
57
Thus, he clearly identifies the requirement that the application of
analogy must be linked to the application of the written law, which
by 1940 was stated by one theorist to exist in a determination that
the socially dangerous act is not covered by the special part of the
code. 58 This theory resulted in the courts in the late 1930s allowing
only a restrictive application of analogy. 59
54. "And now more than ever before there is a need for stability of laws", Stalin's
speech at the VIII Congress of Soviets (1936).
55. Pashukanis, who from 1930 to 1936 headed the Institute of Socialist
Construction and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences, renounced his theories
in 1937. This self-rehabilitation did not save his life. Krylenko was the People's
Commissar of Justice in 1936. He disappeared in 1938.
56. H. Berman, "The Dilemma of Soviet Law Reform" (1963), 76 Harv. L. Rev.
929 (1963) at 932.
57. Translated in Berman, supra note 46 at 149.
58. A. Trainin, "Practical Commentary to Arts. 10 and 16-19 of the Criminal
Code of the R.S.F.S.R.", Soviet Justice, 1940, No. 7, p. 6, translated in Berman,
supra note 46 at 149.
59. H. Berman, Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1966), p. 43.
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Vyshinsky's argument for the continued use of analogy was
challenged. 60 A number of theorists argued pragmatically that
analogy was no longer needed to fight class enemies, and, more
theoretically, that the existence of analogy as an invitation to
judicial legislation undermined the stability of laws. The influence
of this position became predominant, as evidenced by four draft
codes between 1938 and 1952, each of which would have excised
analogy from the criminal law.
This influence was, however, attenuated by the intervention of
World War II. The war years were perceived as a period during
which there was an increase in new and unanticipated forms of
socially dangerous behavior, and an increase in the degree to which
existing crimes were socially dangerous. Hence, the flexibility of
analogy was required in both the definition of crime and the
determination of appropriate punishment.
Following the war further doctrinal restrictions on the use of
analogy continued, and by 1948 many theorists openly advocated its
abolition. In that year the All-Union Institute of Juridicial Sciences
of the Ministry of Justice set out five criteria 61 for the application of
analogy: 1) the act must be socially dangerous within the meaning
of article 6 of the R.S.F.S.R. code; 2) the act must be absent from
the list of crimes contained in the criminal legislation; 3) the act
must be classified under the most similar article of the code; 4) an
act cannot be characterized as criminal by analogy if the law limits
responsibility under some article by special circumstances not
present in the given act; and, 5) the court cannot exceed the
maximum punishment provided by the article which the court
applied by analogy.
The trend represented by these restrictions continued after
Stalin's death in March, 1953, and in 1956 two theorists labeled
Vychinsky's belief in the continued necessity of analogy as
"erroneous". 62 In their opinion the preservation of analogy "is not
only not warranted by necessity but . . . is even capable of causing
damage to the further struggle for strengthening of socialist
legality". 6 3 These ideas represent part of the de-Stalinization desire
to effect liberal reforms. Analogy was no longer necessary to satisfy
60. See Starosolskyj, supra note I at 47-50.
61. Translated in Berman, supra note 46 at 158-159.
62. Id. at 160.
63. Id. at 160.
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"Stalin's passion for security". 64 Also, it was no longer necessary
to fight class enemies. There was a perceived reduction in that
population, a perception ideologically required to lay the foundation
for the 1961 announcement that "a state of all the people exists".65
There is good evidence that these developing ideological shifts
affected court practice, and from the end of the war until the late
1950s "analogy was hardly ever applied in practice". 6
6
2. People's Republic of China (1953-1980)
The changes that were occurring in the Soviet Union with the rise of
stability of law were not adopted or paralleled in China. That this
was to be the case was not at first apparent. During the period
1953-57 the Chinese were preparing "to develop further a
Soviet-style legal system' 67 and they were acting in close
consultation with the Soviets. 68 This was to include a new criminal
code. During the movement "let a hundred flowers bloom, let a
hundred schools contend" there was considerable criticism of
Chinese legal nihilism. In fact the 1957 Peking Lectures predicted
the possible abolition of analogy. The author suggested that "we
believe . . after several years, following the development of the
socialist construction of the State and the daily enrichment of
experience in struggling against crime, under circumstances in
which the criminal code is even more thorough and complete, we
may consider abolishing the system of analogy". 9 The Lectures
also called for conditions restricting the use of analogy and
proposed consideration of an additional requirement that its use
should be subject to approval by higher courts. Further, the Lectures
made some attempt to articulate the essential elements of criminal
conduct. 70
64. J. Hazard, The Soviet Legal Pattern Spreads Abroad: Law in the Soviet Society
(1964), 293.
65. This announcement is most significant. See J. Hazard, Communists & Their
Law (1969), 450.
66. B. Nikiforov, "Fundamentals of Soviet Criminal Law" 23 The Modem L.
Rev. 31 at 34. See also F. H. Feldburgge, "Soviet Criminal Law - The Last Six
Years" (1963), 54 The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science
249 at 261-262.
67. Cohen, supra note 14 at 11.
68. Hazard, supra note 65 at 294.
69. Translated in Cohen, supra note 14 at 337.
70. Cohen, "Reflections on the Criminal Process in China" (1977), 68 The
Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 323 at 335.
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In 1953 a Chinese scholar wrote an article entitled "The Question
of Whether There Should or Should Not be Reasoning by Analogy
in Our Nation's Criminal Law". 71 He recommended that use of
analogy should continue but subject to four criteria: 1) the
criminal's act must harm the entire country; 2) there must be no
written provision covering his action in the criminal law; 3) the law
must deem the general activity a criminal offence; and 4) the
analogy must be made to the closest existing principle in the
criminal law.
These potential reforms were abruptly and effectively stopped by
the anti-rightist movement beginning in 1957.72 The proposed
Criminal Code was not promulgated. With regard to analogy, one
Chinese commentator stated in 1958 that "to propose now the
future abolition of analogy is not only unrealistic, it is also
fuitile" .73 More generally, it has been said that 1957 marks the
beginning of distinct Soviet and Chinese legal models. 74 The
reasons for the distinct developments is not easily identified. It may
be explained by the obvious fact that the Communist regime in
China encountered more difficulty than the Russian Bolsheviks in
effectively consolidating its power. 75 The reason may be
ideological. The Chinese have not accepted the Soviet announce-
ment in 1961 that a "state of the entire people" exists. To the
Chinese, ideology demands the continued existence of class
enemies until communism is achieved. 76 These are, in the socialist
mind, more than mere slogans. Professor Hazard has observed that
"the Soviet jurists in treating their criminals as wayward workmen
rather than class enemies take the position that they must be given
protection against conviction if they are innocent". 77 However, for
the Chinese the continued existence of enemies of the people
requires the use of analogy as one element of the flexibility needed
to root out counterrevolutionaries. As recently as 1977, Professor
71. Ts'ao, in Studies on Political Science and Law (No. 3, 1953) at 11.
72. See generally, Leng, "The Role of Law in the People's Republic of China as
Reflecting Mao Tse-Tung's Influence" (1977), 68 The Journal of Criminal Law &
Criminology 356 at 358.
73. Ming, "Some Opinions about Lectures on the General Principles of Criminal
Law of the PRC", CFYC, 4:73 (1958), translated in Cohen, supra note 14 at 339.
74. Hazard, supra note 65 at 293.
75. Lin, "Communist China's Emerging Fundamentals of Criminal Law" (1974),
13 The American Journal of Comparative Law 80 at 92.
76. Hazard, supra note 65 at 295.
77. Id. at 296.
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Cohen indicated that "China has no belief that it is better to let
many guilty go free than to convict a single innocent person". 78
Finally, the continued use of analogy in China after 1957 may
simply have reflected cultural differences. Professor Hazard has
written that "the traditional Chinese concepts of conciliation and
lack of rigidity in law may have started to re-emerge in 1957". 79
Quite possibly then the answer lies in the difference in the blend of
culture and Marxism in China and the Soviet Union.
Whatever the reason for the Chinese developments in the late
1950s, there can be no question that the model then introduced was
to "enjoy" a long life. In 1977, Professor Edwards observed that
the Chinese "reject the very concepts of stability and predictability
that in the West have given rise to codification and published
judicial decisions". 80 In this climate the principle of analogy cannot
be abolished, but whether it has frequently been used is more
difficult to determine. A commentator stated in 1962 that "the
absence of any systematized criminal code has required the
authorities to apply the analogy principle far more widely then has
been the case in the USSR"."' However, in 1977 Professor Chiu
observed that:
In judicial practice, even the discussion of whether analogy or
retroactivity should be used is not relevant to an accused, because
the PRC has only a few pieces of criminal legislation. It does not
seem possible for legal personnel to make widespread use of the
doctrine of analogy or retroactivity. Moreover, in rendering a
sentence, a PRC court is not required to cite the legal basis of its
decision, except to include the vague expression of
"Sentence . . . according to law". 82
The few pieces of legislation referred to are essentially those already
in existence in the 1950s as no significant criminal legislation was
enacted in the 1960s or 1970s.
78. Cohen, supra note 71 at 339.
79. Hazard, supra note 65 at 295. See also, Lin, supra note 76 at 84.
80. R. Edwards, "Reflections on Crime and Punishment in China with Appended
Sentencing Documents" (1977), 16 The Columbia Journal of Trans-national Law
45 at 52.
81. Lin, supra note 76 at 87.
82. H. Chiu, "Criminal Punishment in Mainland China: A Study of Some Yunnan
Province Documents" (1977), 68 The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 384
at 189.
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V. Analogy and the Modern Era
1. Soviet Union -The 1958 Reforms
In 1958 the Supreme Soviet passed the Basic Principles of Criminal
Legislation. This represents a significant turning point in Soviet
criminal law. The Basic Principles are, of course, faithfully
reproduced in the Republic Codes, and the new R.S.F.S.R. Code
was adopted in 1960. Article 3 abolishes the principle of analogy in
providing that "only persons guilty of committing a crime, that is,
those who intentionally or by negligence have committed a socially
dangerous act specified by the criminal statute, shall be held
responsible and incur punishment". 8 3 Also, the retroactive
application of law is now prohibited by article 6.
It should be noted that the abolition of analogy and retroactive
application of law does not necessarily equate with the practice of
the principle nulla poena sine lege. The flexibility achieved through
analogy may be achieved in other ways, principal among these
being the use of vaguely defined crimes. If a specific crime is
defined so broadly as to encompass myriad forms of behavior, then
the formal abolition of analogy is a facade. As each cell contains its
own genetic code, each vaguely defined crime allows within its own
meaning all that was permitted by analogy. My present purpose is
simply to point out the possibility. 84
2. People's Republic of China -The 1980 Criminal Law
On July 1, 1979 China's first comprehensive Criminal Law since
the Communist revolution was passed by the Second Session of the
Fifth National People's Congress. This law became effective on
January 1, 1980, together with a new law on Criminal Procedure.
The form of these laws is modem. The Criminal Law contains both
general and special provisions. The general provisions set out the
"guiding ideology, task and scope of application" (chapter 1) of
criminal law, the nature of "offences and responsibility for a
crime" (chapter 2), and detailed general provisions on "punish-
ments" (chapters 3 and 4) together with miscellaneous "other
provisions" (chapter 5). The specific provisions contain the
definition and range of punishment for numerous crimes to be found
83. Translated in Berman, supra note 60 at 145.
84. See B. Ramundo, "Analogy Reincarnated: A Note on the Form and Substance
of Soviet Legal Reform" (1963), 19 Military Law Review 152.
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in any modem criminal code, together with crimes of more
"ideological" content such as the detailed provisions on "counter-
revolution" (article 90 to 104).
The new Criminal Law retains the principle of analogy subject to
one important restriction. Article 79 provides: "Those who commit
offences not explicitly defined in the specifics of the criminal law
may be convicted and sentenced according to the most appropriate
article in the criminal law. However, approval must be obtained
from the Higher People's Court". The definition of an "offence" is
provided in Article 10:
Any action which endangers state sovereignty and territorial
integrity, jeopardizes the dictatorship of the proletariat, sabotages
socialist revolution and socialist construction, disrupts public
order, encroaches upon the property of the whole people, the
collective or legitimate private property, infringes upon the
personal rights, democratic rights of citizens, or any other action
which endangers society and is punishable according to law is an
offence. However, if the offence is obviously a minor one and if
its harm is negligible, it should not be considered a crime.
Thus, the field of application of analogy is very great indeed. For
sentencing law, article 59 contains an "analogy-like" provision in
that it allows imposition of a punishment less than the minimum
where that minimum is "too heavy based on the concrete conditions
of the case". Retroactive application of the Criminal Law is
prohibited in article 9, except that the new law exonerates an act
which is criminal under former law but is no longer considered an
offence and the new law may mitigate punishment that would have
formerly been imposed.
The retention of analogy together with the ban on retroactivity
and numerous "safeguards" now to be enjoyed by the accused
presents an unusual juxtaposition. It is as if the Chinese have made a
great forward leap, but with slight hesitation on take-off. This raises
two questions: why was analogy retained and will analogy be used?
The answers cannot, at this time, be entirely satisfactory. There is
no available empirical data which would provide an answer to the
second question, and there has been little doctrinal comment which
directly answers the first question. However, some clues are
provided by the recent comments of the Central People's
Broadcasting station. 85 On July 13, 1979 this station began a series
85. "Lectures on the Criminal Law", translated in (1980), 13 Chinese Law and
Government 1.
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of thirteen lectures to the public to explain the new Criminal Law.
Lecture III contains a clear indication that the conditions which are
usually seen to justify the use of analogy, i.e. the constantly
changing nature of crime, continue to exist. The speaker noted that
"another factor to consider is that the answer to the question of
which conduct belongs to the category of crime is not a fixed and
unchanging one - there is some conduct that was not previously
considered criminal that, as a result of change of circumstances,
may under today's laws be defined as criminal". 86 It should be
noted that this statement was made in the context of an explanation
of the etiology of crime, and not in direct reference to analogy.
Indeed, the 112 page transcript of these lectures does not contain a
single direct reference to analogy. In addition to the fact just quoted,
one must recall the basic ideological and cultural distinctions
between the Chinese and the Soviets. It may be that Chinese culture
and their brand of Marxism require the contained possibility of
using analogy, whether or not it is in fact used.
It is unlikely that analogy will receive frequent use in the People's
Republic of China. Analogy flourishes when there is a widespread
perception that flexibility is required. The use of analogy is an
offspring of a climate of legal nihilism. The 1979 Lectures indicate
that this is exactly what the Chinese wish to avoid. In Lecture IV the
author states that "we must resolutely oppose the handling of cases
without regard for existing law and without adherence to existing
rules, the substituting of feeling for policy, the reliance on words
instead of on law, and other such conduct which violates law and
discipline".87 This theme, which is found throughout the lectures,
is repeated with particular vigor in the final lecture:
Only through the strict implementation of the laws can the
national will and the people's will be correctly embodied.
Otherwise, the laws lose their sanctity and authority and become
so many pieces of paper, and the national will and the people's
will cannot be realized. This is something the country and the
people will not permit. Up to now the Criminal Law has not been
implemented, China's criminal laws are not complete and crimes
are often ascertained and penalties meted out on the basis of a
leader's words . . . Once the Criminal Law has gone into effect,
when a criminal case comes up, it will absolutely not do to ignore
the clear provisions of the law which stare one in the face and
86. Id. at 27.
87. Id. at 37.
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persist in handling the mater according to the 'memorandum' of
this or that leader. This is illegal conduct. 88
Thus, it appears reasonable to conclude that analogy will not often
be used. Of course, only future history will tell.
VI. Nulla Poena Sine Lege and Common Law Crimes
The principle nulla poena sine lege has been dominant in Western
Europe at least since the French Declaration of the Rights of Man in
1789.89 Article 8 provides: "The law may establish only such
punishments as are strictly necessary. No one may be punished
except according to a law enacted and promulgated before the
commission of the offence and lawfully applied". In England, the
rule of law has been established since the time of the promulgation
of the Charter of Henry the First, 90 and Canada has, of course,
received this tradition. And in the United States the "void-for-
vagueness" doctrine and the constitutional prohibition against ex
post facto laws have established a rule of law.
This is not to assert that the history of the principle of rule of law
demonstrates an unbroken or pure application of its central concept,
viz., the concept that behaviour should not be considered criminal
unless precisely defined as criminal in a penal law of prospective
effect only. This is certainly not the case.91 But the dominant
Western theme has been the rule of law, the central achievement of
which is the establishment of "a definite limitation on the power of
the State" .92
There is, however, one challenge to the purity of the rule of law
in the Anglo-American tradition which could be made and which is
of particular interest in a comparative study of analogy. This is the
creation of crime at common law, a matter of contemporary interest
because it still may occur in the State law of the United States. This
does not raise an issue of pragmatic importance. In England,
Professor Glanville Williams wrote in 1961 that "the creative
powers of the judges in the realm of criminal law have almost
88. Id. at 107.
89. Hall (1960), supra note 2 at 33.
90. Id. at 31. For Canada, see the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
1982.
91. See generally note 5 supra.
92. Hall (1960), supra note 2 at 27.
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withered away" 93 and common law crimes have been abolished in
Canada. 94 In the United States "the trend in the twentieth
century ... is to enact comprehensive new criminal codes,
abolishing common law crimes in the process". 95 However, from
the doctrinal point of view, is the creation of crime at common law
distinct from analogy?
The answer to the question posed lies in the meaning of the term
analogy. It is clear that in the socialist applications we have
examined, analogy is an instrument of flexibility, a means of
enforcing whatever ideology is currently valued. In the application
it has received, socialist analogy has denied any role of certainty
and predictability in law. In this sense it is definitely qualitatively
distinguished from the process of creating crimes at common law.
That process has been described by Professor Hall, thus:
The necessary use of analogy, especially by Anglo-American
judges, is a process that is so minute in the changes effected as to
be hardly perceptible. Excepting occasional leaps that undoub-
tedly occur, it reflects the day-by-day growth of criminal law
which, for the most part keeps pace with change in the language
institution itself. It has thus amounted largely to an all-but-
unnoticed bringing up-to-date of old terms so that, filled with
new content, they referred more adequately to the changed
conditions. When American judges speak of expanding criminal
law by 'analogy', they certainly do not mean the so-called 'legal
analogy', the deliberate lawmaking, avowed and apparent to all,
which was required in the Russian and German
innovations . ., they are speaking of necessary analogy,
limited by the traditional judicial function to apply, not to make,
law and restricted by the canon of strict construction illustrated in
a vast number of decided cases. 96
VII. Conclusion
The study of analogy in the Soviet Union and the People's Republic
of China demonstrates that the theoretical foundations and actual
applications of the principle follow a definite pattern. In the early
93. G. Williams, supra note 5 at 591.
94. Article 8 of the Criminal Code of Canada provides" "Notwithstanding
anything in this Act or any other Act no person shall be convicted (a) of an offence
at common law...". See generally Mewett and Manning, "Criminal Law"
(1978) at 3-10.
95. W. LaFave and A. Scott, "Handbook on Criminal Law" (St. Paul: West,
1972) at p. 60.
96. Hall (1960), supra note 2 at 48-49.
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years the drive to consolidate power requires extreme flexibility, an
unfettered discretion to deal with any real or perceived threats. This
is the climate in which analogy, as a political instrument, may
flourish. However, once the political viability of the new regime is
assured, legal stability is required. Thus the application of analogy,
as a crude instrument of political suppression, must atrophy. A
stable socialist political system must have more refined means of
advancing the State's interests.
There will be variations on this pattern. If written laws are
established at an early stage, as in the Soviet Union, analogy will be
frequently applied. But if the new regime does not establish a
network of written laws, as in China, then there is no law to apply
analogously. Rather, flexibility will be achieved through the very
absence of defined prohibitions. Analogy in China became
subsumed in a political and legal system of even greater fluidity
than the early Soviet regime. But in either system the application of
analogy is destined to diminish. Whether it is formally abolished, as
in the Soviet Union, or whether it simply recedes in potential
importance, as will probably be the case in China, is determined by
political and cultural factors indigenous to each system.
The gradual withering away of socialist analogy does not indicate
a movement to the adoption of those Western values which require
certainty and predictability in the administration of criminal laws.
There is not a scintilla of evidence that the increasing disuse of
analogy in these socialist societies represents increasing belief in the
value of protecting the individual from the State. Rather, the change
is a change within the socialist system itself and not an indication of
a rapprochement between Eastern and Western values. Whatever
certainty and predictability is achieved by abolishing socialist
analogy does not necessarily reflect the same values which militate
against analogy in Western law.
(c) Dana Giovannetti 1982
